

by suburban rings. They generally deplored the suburbs and believed that the central areas were in decline.

Historically, it is hardly surprising that they had this American focus and concentrated on this city form. After World War II, the United States was a dominant power, with Richard Neutra, another conference participant, even going so far as to describe the moment as “invaded by ‘Americanism’ in terms of the urban scene.”<sup>3</sup> Moreover, knowingly or not, the participants were also in a part of the world strongly characterized by Keynesian politico-economic beliefs in the welfare state and by Fordism in modes of production, as well as the outcomes of these orientations in making landscapes. In essence, states were committed to fostering full employment and cushioning economic turbulence within their borders.<sup>4</sup> Further, outside of these so-called First World circumstances, including the well-developed countries of Europe—Japan was yet to join their ranks—there were also the Second World of Soviet-style command economics focused on rapid industrialization and an emerging Third World of developmental states beginning to make their way into the fringes of modernization. Certainly in 1956 most of the First and Second Worlds also found themselves confronting the horrible prospect of mortal combat in the cold war, and decolonization and the subsequent struggle for development were just under way in several parts of the developing world and hardly seen as shaping urbanization in any particular sense. Well in the future lay the fuller rise of the Western liberal economic order, although some hallmarks were beginning to be felt. What subsequently transpired was a transformation of the function and nature of states, a significant rise of international organizations, both institutional and private, and substantial shifts in the complexity and transformative power of available technologies. Indeed, fifty years on, most of the centrally planned states have disappeared, while the welfare and developmental states have given way, at least significantly, to various versions of what has been called the “competition state,” wherein the provision of welfare and other support to citizens changed appreciably toward preparing them and their corporations for international competition.<sup>5</sup> To be sure, there are still debates about the relative efficacy of liberal Anglo-American systems, more welfare-centered European arrangements, and Asian corporatist practices intertwining business and government with the relative subordination of labor. Nevertheless, by and large, there has been and continues to be a shift toward the competition state.