

these factors of knowledge power, cultural capital and initiative give Hadid three cards to play in the negotiation game. Clearly she must have played them well, since she gets what she wants. How does her strategy work?

First, we can see that these cards are not played indiscriminately, but are mobilised in support of clear objectives. We can see, for example, that she has a clear conception of the form – or at least, the kind of form – she wants. This conception is set according to her own internal rules. Partly these are rules about what constitutes ‘good design’ in her terms, but she also has rules about the way architects ought to behave in their relationships with their clients, rules about which potential negotiating ploys would be legitimate in which circumstances. If these internal rules are transgressed, internal psychological sanctions come into force. Beyond a certain point of compromise over the physical form, for example, a sense of guilt – a sense of betraying one’s own values – might have become so strong that quitting the job might have been the only way of coping with it. In our example, this point was never reached. We might sense a degree of guilt, however, about working to the letter rather than the evident spirit of the client’s brief – a sense of guilt warded off by reference to another, ‘higher’ internal rule of general fair play. *‘They always say we didn’t understand . . . so I played the same game.’*²⁰

Not all the rules and sanctions within which Hadid has to work are internal ones. There is also a complex envelope of external rules and sanctions which determine the space within which she can operate. For example, too much design compromise – even if she could live with it herself – would run the risk of losing the cultural capital which is bestowed by the acclamation of her peers. This would be a serious matter, for cultural capital brings with it respect, and therefore enhanced negotiating power. Conversely, pushing too hard to get what she wants runs up against the ultimate external sanction of unemployment. Repeated too often, this would lead in turn to the higher order sanction of bankruptcy. Together, these webs of internal and external rules, and the sanctions through which they are enforced, create a ‘field of opportunity’ within which the designer can work. The success of the negotiation, from her point of view, depends on her ability to get where she wants to within this field. And that, in turn, depends on her ability to mobilise her own resources – resources such as initiative, determination, knowledge and cultural capital – so as to influence the other parties to the negotiation in the most effective way.

The effective targeting of resources depends largely on mobilising them to offer the other actors things they want, or to prevent them from getting these, unless they grant one’s own objectives. The practical difficulty here lies in knowing how far the other actors can be pushed before they arrive at the limits of the opportunity field, where they come up against internal or external sanctions on their own actions.

For example, developers working in the private sector have rules about making profits. These are not optional rules, for they are externally enforced through sanctions of bankruptcy; in a capitalist society, private-sector developers have no escape from this, if they want to stay in business. But where does the limit of the field of opportunity lie in this regard? How does the designer (for example) know how far developers can be pushed before they really have to dig in their heels? It is not hard to see that the more the designer (or any other actor) understands the rules and sanctions of the other actors – particularly those with the most power – the more effectively the designer’s own resources can be targeted. In this particular case, for example, it would clearly be advantageous for designers to understand how to do developer-type financial feasibility calculations, to prevent the wool being pulled over their eyes too easily.

In the Zaha Hadid example, she is in fact negotiating with a non-profit developer of social housing, so different rules and sanctions apply. Still, even developers like these have rules about how their resources are to be allocated, and targets about how many housing units (for example) they are to build for a given allocation. Sensibly, she accepts these limits; arguing about the form, but proposing a building of the same average height, and therefore the same internal content, as the developers’ brief requires. As part of the negotiated deal, the developer is of course getting something else he wants: the ‘Zaha Hadid original’ for whose production she was hired in the first place. This clearly sets a favourable climate of negotiation from the outset. In turn, this makes it easier for the developer to accept a breach of the ‘I pay the piper so I should call the tune’ rule which lies somewhere under the surface of all commercial transactions, particularly since this breach is legitimated by the claim of a simple misunderstanding (‘I don’t understand what they are saying’) and enforced by calling on a whole network of legal rules and sanctions too (‘you did tell me in writing’). Finally, hanging silently in the air in this negotiation, is the fact that ‘I always made