responsible for all the nation's sites is sharing a decision about one site with a community that only possesses that one site, then even if both sides agree on the absolute gain or loss due to some option, the community will feel that gain much more than the conservator, and any loss even more so. When we are sharing conservation decisions, we should be sensitive to phrases such as, "It is the only one we have" or, "I don't want to take any chance of damaging it". Such biases are not errors, they are explanations of legitimate differences in perspective.

The second group of heuristics is the one learned by individuals through long experience (a minimum of 10 years). In the past, this kind of thinking was referred to as tacit knowledge. Experts merge such tacit knowledge with the explicit knowledge of their discipline, even in professions that pride themselves on their objectivity rather than their skills, such as scientists (Collins, 2010). Classic examples in the literature are taken from professions that do pride themselves on tacit knowledge – the fire chief's ability to 'read' a fire and how to attack it; the fine art expert who can 'read' a sculpture as authentic or 'wrong'. Research has clarified that valid heuristics of this type can only emerge for phenomena that actually have a consistent *pattern* that can be *observed*, even if subliminal. The stock market, for example, is *not* such a system. 'Hot' brokers do emerge from time to time, but they are not proof of special pattern recognition, they are equivalent to long strings of the same digit that emerge from time to time in a random number sequence.

What lessons for our shared decisions? I think we need to accept that valid tacit expert knowledge does exist, that it is not subjective in the pejorative sense, but that asking an expert to fully explain how they reached their judgement is of limited use (but worth trying). Scepticism about expertise should be based on two questions: do we think that the phenomenon in question has an observable pattern, and does this person have at least a decade of relevant immersion in this phenomenon. Expert elicitation tools such as the Delphi Method further refine reliability by asking for the opinion of many credible experts, and ensuring that individual opinions are documented before group-think sets in.

The third group of heuristics has been created by researchers who look for patterns in large sets of data. The classic example is a fast three-step decision tree developed to sort cardiac emergency patients into high and low risk groups. This simple decision tree, derived from the analysis of many hospital records, is not only faster and cheaper than traditional and more detailed diagnoses, but also more reliable. Karsten (2016) is developing heuristics for risk assessment of collections. By analyzing many laborious comprehensive risk assessments, she has also found short sequences of simple questions that provide reliable prediction of certain high risks, such as flood damage and fire damage. Sharing during decision-making enlarges the pool of data, and the larger the pool of data, the more likely it is for a valid