more passionate (Kahan *et al*., 2011). In other words, a better informed rider simply becomes a better rationalizer for the elephant and its *a priori* values. When sharing contentious decisions with stakeholders, technical experts, such as conservators, cannot assume that their greater technical knowledge is their most persuasive tool. Worse than that, we must understand that our expertise may be blinding us to the true source of our opposition to the other point of view – our own elephant's values. Is it really facts and reasoning that leads some of us to value original material over original intent in a painting, or deeply buried beliefs?

One method that can help move an elephant's opinions (slowly) is 'framing' the issue in a more agreeable context. For example, let's not speak about that cabal of arrogant museum directors obsessed with blockbuster shows who forced the relaxation of relative humidity standards, and let's begin our discussion instead with the possibility that you can become the hero who gets your museum its environmental certification…now, with that 'in mind', let's reconsider the scientific evidence on the dimensional response of paint!

The sanctity/degradation foundation

Haidt has proposed five modules within the elephant's thinking about right and wrong, which he calls our moral foundations (moralfoundations.org, 2017). I think that one in particular resonates with our field: the sanctity/degradation foundation. I think that all the polemics about 'cleaning controversies' are after-the-fact rationalizing by our rider of the outrage triggered in the sanctity/degradation module of our elephant. This sense of sacrilege is evident in the title chosen for the lengthiest tract ever published in this vein – *The Ravished Image, or, How to ruin masterpieces by restoration* (Walden, 1985).

The "hands-on" blame module

Greene's (2013) specialty is thought experiments, such as the question posed earlier about five people trapped on a train track which you can save by pulling a switch that redirects the train on to a track where one person is trapped. Most people (87 percent) state that they would pull the switch to sacrifice one and save five. Greene calls this the utilitarian decision. But, what if you yourself must push the person on to the tracks to stop the train and save the five. Most people state that they would not push a person to save five others, even though the utilitarian argument is unchanged. When asked this question as well as other dilemmas, medical doctors decide similarly to the general population (don't harm the one). Public health professionals, however, are more likely to make the utilitarian choice (save the five) although they do acknowledge discomfort. I think there are two situations where this public health difference might emerge in our field.

First, conservation professionals have learned to become utilitarian in their judgements since they think of what's best for the long-term