

[Part 3]  
Integrity, Authenticity, and Key  
Management

Chapter 11

Message Integrity and  
Message Authentication

Forouzan, B.A. Cryptography and Network Security (International Edition). United States: McGraw Hill, 2008. 1.1

Chapter 11 Objectives

- To define message integrity.
- To define message authenticity.
- To define criteria for a cryptography hash function.
- To distinguish between an MDC and a MAC.
- To discuss some common MACs.

MDC: Modification Detection Code. || MAC : Message Authentication Code. 1.2

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Chapter 11 11.1 Introduction

- This chapter discusses general ideas related to cryptographic hash functions that are used to create a message digest from a message.
- Message digest guarantee the *integrity* of the message.
- We will discuss how simple message digests can be modified to authenticate the message.
- The standard cryptography cryptographic hash functions will be discussed in Chapter 12.

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Chapter 11 11.2 Message Integrity

Introduction

- The cryptography systems that discussed so far provide *secrecy* or *confidentiality*, but not *integrity*.
- However, there are occasions that may not even need confidentiality but instead must have integrity.
- Example:
  - Ahmad may write a will to distribute his estate upon his death.
  - The will does not need to be encrypted because anyone can examine the will after he died.
  - However, the integrity of the will needs to be preserved so that the contents of the will is unchanged.

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Chapter 11 11.2 Message Integrity

Document and Fingerprint

- On way to preserve the integrity of a document is through the use of a *fingerprint*.
- If Alice needs to ensure the content of her document will not changed, she can put her fingerprint at the bottom of the document.
- Eve cannot modify the contents of the document or create a false document because she cannot she cannot forge Alice's fingerprint.


Q: How to ensure the document not been changed?  
A: Compare Alice's fingerprint on the document with Alice's fingerprint on file.

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Chapter 11 11.2 Message Integrity

### Message and Message Digest

- The electronic equivalent of the document and fingerprint pair is the *message* and *digest* pair.
- A message is passed through an algorithm called a *cryptographic hash function* to preserve the integrity.
- The function creates a compressed image of the message that can be used like a fingerprint.



```
graph LR; A[Message (document)] --> B[Hash function]; B --> C[Message digest (fingerprint)];
```



Figure 11.2: Message and digest

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Chapter 11 11.2 Message Integrity

- The two pairs (document/fingerprint) and (message/message digest) are similar, with some differences:
  - (document/fingerprint) are physically linked together.
  - (message/message digest) can be unlinked and send separately.
- The most important:
  - message digest needs to be safe from any change.

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Chapter 11 11.2 Message Integrity

**(a) Preimage Resistance**

- A cryptographic hash function must be preimage resistance.

M: Message  
Hash: Hash function  
h(M): Digest

Alice: M → Hash → y = h(M)

Eve: Given: y  
Find: any M' such that y = h(M')

To Bob

Figure 11.5: Preimage 1.13

Chapter 11 11.2 Message Integrity

**(b) Second Preimage Resistance**

- Ensure a message cannot easily be forged.

M: Message  
Hash: Hash function  
h(M): Digest

Alice: M → Hash → h(M)  
M + h(M)

Eve: Given: M and h(M)  
Find: M' such that M ≠ M', but h(M) = h(M')

To Bob

Figure 11.6: Second preimage 1.14

Chapter 11 11.2 Message Integrity

**(c) Collision Resistance**

- Ensure a message cannot easily be forged.

M: Message  
Hash: Hash function  
h(M): Digest

Find: M and M' such that  $M \neq M'$ , but  $h(M) = h(M')$




Figure 11.7: Collision preimage

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Chapter 11 11.3 Message Authentication

Introduction

- The message digest guarantees the integrity of a message that not been changed.
- However, message digest does not authenticate the sender of the message.
- To provide message authentication, sender needs to provide proof that he/she sending the message and not an impostor.
- The digest created by a cryptographic hash function is called a *Modification Detection Code* (MDC).
  - detect any modification in the message.
- For message authentication, we need a *Message Authentication Code* (MAC).

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

Chapter 11 11.3 Message Authentication


Modification Detection Code (MDC)

- MDC is a message digest that can prove the integrity of the message that not been changed during transmission.

- Sender create a message digest MDC, and sends with the message to receiver.
- Receiver creates a new MDC from the message and **compare** the MDC received.
- If they are the same, the message has not been changed.
- [Figure 11.8](#) illustrates the idea.

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Chapter 11 11.4 Summary

- A *fingerprint* or a *message digest* can be used to ensure the integrity of a document or a message:
  - ❑ To ensure the integrity of a document, both document and fingerprint are needed.
  - ❑ To ensure the integrity of a message, both message and message digest are needed.
- A *message digest* needs to be kept safe from change.

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Chapter 11 11.4 Summary

- A cryptographic hash function creates a message digest out of a message that meets three criteria: *preimage resistance*, *second preimage resistance*, and *collision resistance*.
- A MDC is a message digest that can prove the integrity of the message that not been changed.
- To prove the integrity of a message and the data origin authentication (message authentication), we need to change MDC to MAC with a secret between sender and receiver.

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Chapter **11**Exercises

**Exercise 11.1:**

- a) Distinguish between *message integrity* and *message authentication*.
- b) Define the criteria for a cryptographic hash function.
- c) Distinguish between an MDC and a MAC.

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